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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Curtis fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Her brief begins with a 
statement of the case that is argumentative, continues with "facts" well outside the 
record, and ends with arguing unpresented issues. 
The Court should disregard —if not strike —Curtis's brief for these failures. 
R E S P O N S E TO A P P E L L E E ' S S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Those who rewrite history do probably believe with part of their minds that they are ac-
tually thrusting facts into the past.... They feel that their own version was what hap-
pened in the sight of God, and that one is justified in rearranging the records accordingly. 
— George Orwell 
Maese appeals the trial court's ruling that he was unentitled to a continuance. He con-
tends that the trial court both abused its discretion and violated Rule 74(c). Facts unre-
lated to his counsel's withdrawal and the court's directives are window dressing. 
Still, Curtis spends the bulk of her brief vilifying Maese. This is not a trial court and 
the panel is not a jury. Yet Curtis's brief invokes the old lawyer maxim, when the facts 
~ ! ~ 
are against you, argue the law. When the law is against you, argue the facts. When both 
the facts and law are against you, pound the table. 
A. The Criminal Cases. 
Curtis begins her statement of facts with a subheading titled "The Criminal Cases/7 
That entire section points to cases outside the scope of this case's record. What the State 
alleged or failed to allege is immaterial to this case. Moreover, the State amended the in-
formation against Maese and accused him of two counts of Attempted Violation of the 
Private Investigator Act—charges that bolster Maese's claim that he was acting in an in-
vestigatory capacity. In any event, these are not facts from this record. 
Also, facts with citations are misstated. Curtis claims that Maese hired a private in-
vestigator to "document any possible probation violations so that he could harass" Cur-
tis.1 The record fails to substantiate this "fact." It is fiction. 
Curtis cannot relitigate this case in this forum; especially with immaterial or miss-
tated facts and inflammatory words designed to cloud the Court's view of the law. 
B. The Civil Stalking Injunction 
Curtis fails to cite the record for her facts; the first three paragraphs of this subsection 
contain one citation—to two lines of transcript. This entire section is irrelevant to the is-
sues before the court. 
C. The Civil Stalking Injunction Hearing 
Here, Curtis relitigates the underlying stalking injunction. Maese is not appealing the 
stalking injunction. Maese appeals the trial court's denial of his continuance and the 
1
 Brief of Appellee at 3. 
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Rule 74(c) violation. This entire section relates to the stalking injunction itself and is 
immaterial to determining whether or not the trial court erred. 
It is purely inflammatory and provocative. 
D. Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
This section references a document which speaks for itself and is irrelevant to this issues 
presented on appeal. 
E. Maese's Motion for a New Trial 
Finally, Curtis addresses relevant facts. Yet she distorts these "facts." For example, Cur-
tis states that "Ms. Skordas quoted an affidavit submitted on Maese's behalf by another 
attorney that indicated Maese knew Mr. Athay would not file the frivolous motions."2 
The actual transcript which Curtis quotes reads: 
Paragraph 9 then states, "On or about March 3rd I spoke with Mr. Athay and 
asked if he was prepared to proceed with the hearing on March 6th, even though 
he didn't have the discovery. Mr. Athay stated approximately 'What defense 
would now argue? I don't believe I can argue any defense to the injunction. I be-
lieve the injunction is moot because there's a no contact order.'"3 
Mr. Athay believed a stalking injunction was moot where a no contact order in a 
criminal case is in place. The record reveals that at trial, Mr. Athay advanced this very 
argument. The trial court rejected this argument, with the following exchange: 
THE TRIAL COURT: Mr. Maese could simply stipulate to a 36-month civil stalking 
injunction, which doesn't put any additional burdens on him it 
seems to me. That would forego the need to have a hearing. 
MR. ATHAY: Judge, Mr. Maese and I had several discussions in that regard, 
and we are at a substantial disagreement. In fact, the law-
2
 Brief of Appellee at 12. 
3 R. at 349 (Tr. 10:4-10, May 5, 2009). 
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yer/client relationship is literally broken down over these very 
issues.4 
Maese saw that Mr. Athay had one defense, mootness. Maese asked Mr. Athay to 
prepare a more robust defense. Characterizing this request as "frivolous" is surreal. 
Moreover, this exchange shows that Maese was correct: Mr. Athay was unprepared. He 
had one arrow in his quiver and that arrow was unrelated to the merits. 
* * * 
Curtis fails to dispute any material facts set forth by Maese. And with the subtlety of a 
jackhammer, her statement of facts attempts to distract the Court by vilifying Maese. 
The message is clear: Sustain the trial court's ruling because Maese is a mean man. Yet 
the appeals process is designed to focus on the law, not passions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Maese's motion for a 
continuance to obtain counsel. 
The Parties agree that the Longcrier5 test appropriately determines whether or not a trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. Below, Maese shows that Curtis's 
factual and legal interpretation regarding its implementation is flawed. 
A. Maese did not request prior continuances. Curtis concedes the docket reflects 
this yet attempts to dispute that with her counsel's statements. 
Curtis claims that "at least the continuance immediately prior to the stalking injunction 
hearing was at his counsel's urging and for his benefit. R. 331A: 4 (19-25)."6 The tran-
script portion Curtis cites states: 
4
 R. at 331A (Tr. 3:15-25, March 6, 2009). 
5
 Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Ms. HYDE: Your Honor, for the record, we object to a continuance. We 
agreed to one before, and it was fairly substantial because of 
the concerns about Fifth Amendment privilege in a pending 
trial, but we specifically reserve the right to go forward today. 
If there's some reason Mr. Maese continued that jury trial, 
which is, in fact, what happened, and it's now pending. We're 
prepared to go forward, Judge.7 
Curtis cites Ms. Hyde's argument for the proposition that Maese previously re-
quested a continuance. Yet the record fails to show this. As Maese stated in his Brief, the 
parties stipulated to a continuance. Curtis concedes that "The docket suggests that the 
continuances were stipulated to by counsel."8 Therefore this prong of the Longcrier test 
weighs towards Maese. 
B. Curtis concedes that inconvenience was not a factor. 
Ms. Curtis argues that she was inconvenienced because the hearing was held months af-
ter she filed her injunction and not days. This argument is meritless for two reasons. 
First, Utah Code contemplates a 10-day time frame for an expedited stalking injunc-
tion hearing for the benefit of the Respondent, not the Petitioner. This is revealed by the 
code which requires hearings after the initial 10-day expedited hearing deadline. In re-
levant part the code states: 
If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the 
court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date requested....9 
6
 Brief of Appellee at 15-16. 
7
 R. at 331A (Tr. 4:19-25, March 6, 2009). 
8
 Brief of Appellee at 16. 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(10). 
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Under Utah law, Maese could have requested a hearing at anytime. Accordingly, the 
10-day expedited time frame had been previously waived by Maese. 
Second, and more importantly, Ms. Curtis enjoyed the protection of the stalking in-
junction during any continuance. She was unprejudiced. 
Finally, Curtis states that a further continuance would inconvenience the court. She 
states this without citing any authority. The Court cannot be prejudiced; only litigants 
can be inconvenienced. Otherwise, the Court is constantly inconvenienced. 
This factor weighs in Maese's favor. 
C. Maese's request was legitimate. Moreover, Ms. Curtis severely misstates the 
record and extrapolates erroneous conclusions. 
Curtis claims that "Mr. Athay's withdrawal could not have been spontaneous because 
both Maese and Mr. Athay stated that Maese had spoken to a different attorney about 
representation in this case/'10 Curtis has reached a spurious conclusion. 
Indisputably, Maese was looking for a different attorney. Yet after failing to find a 
replacement, Maese expected Mr. Athay to show up to court that day and put on a de-
fense. Mr. Athay failed to do that and nothing in the record shows that Mr. Athay told 
Maese, "Hey, if you don't like my mootness defense, I'm going to withdraw." Prior to 
that morning, Mr. Athay never told Maese he was withdrawing. 
Instead, Mr. Athay unilaterally withdrew because Maese insisted he develop a de-
fense on the merits; to actually work on the case for which he had been retained. 
Mr. Athay's withdrawal was spontaneous and his withdrawal was a legitimate rea-
son to continue the hearing. This factor weighs in Maese's favor. 
10
 Brief of Appellee at 16. 
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D. Maese did not contribute to Mr. Athay's request to withdraw. 
Curtis argues, "Mr. Athay stated that part of the breakdown was because he would not 
comply with some of Maese7s demands" and therefore Maese contributed to the need 
for a continuance. Yet as the record demonstrates, Mr. Athay wanted to fight the stalk-
ing injunction on mootness grounds alone. His eggs were in one basket. Maese asked 
him to also prepare a meritorious defense. Asking for an ethical, meritorious defense — 
including documents and witnesses — cannot contribute to a continuance. Moreover, 
Curtis fails to cite authority for her proposition. This factor weighs in Maese's favor. 
E. Maese was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. 
1. The failures cited by Curtis - lack of witnesses and lack of preparation - relate to 
Maese s representation, the cause of the continuance. Therefore Maese s prejudice 
is self evident. 
Curtis states that Maese failed to call any witnesses on his behalf. Maese agrees. This is 
the crux of Maese's case on appeal. Maese asked his attorney to prepare a meritorious 
defense, he did not. 
Incredulously, Curtis points out that Maese was incarcerated11 and then says that he 
was responsible to confer with his attorney;12 that he had time to prepare yet squan-
dered it.13 Logic and common sense tell us that when someone is incarcerated, he is at 
his attorney's mercy. He cannot simply make an appointment with a secretary. Also, he 
cannot prepare to defend against litigation without resources. In jail, even paper and 
pencils are rationed. 
11
 Brief of Appellee at 5. 
12
 Id. at 17. 
13
 Ibid. 
r^/ / /••o 
Maese did not fail to confer with his attorney, or fail to prepare for his case, or fail to 
call witnesses. Maese was restrained from doing so, and the person whom he enlisted 
for help — Mr. Athay — did not help him. 
2. The lack of witnesses prejudiced Maese. 
Although Maese sees how his brief may have been unclear, witnesses on his behalf 
would have shown his conduct was commensurate with exercising a constitutionally 
protected right to investigate witnesses against him. 
Witnesses would have also shown Curtis never expressed that she felt fear until after 
she filed the stalking injunction. Her fear was found only after she discovered a way to 
exploit it. Moreover, Maese asked his attorney to compel Curtis to comply with the trial 
court's order. He failed to, and Curtis escaped discovery. 
These are all prejudicial factors. The Court cannot ignore a truism: If things are not 
the same, they are different. 
A trial court may choose to ignore all the evidence in front of it. In that case a litigant 
can appeal on clearly erroneous facts. Here, Maese did not have that option because he 
was unable to present an adequate defense to the allegations against him. 
This Court cannot ignore the prejudice incurred by a lack of witnesses. More impor-
tantly, a trial court could not ignore the weight of properly admitted evidence. If Maese 
had proper representation, he would have admitted evidence proving he did not stalk 
Curtis which would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. 
3. Maese is not an attorney and certainly not a trial attorney. 
Curtis asserts that because Maese performed some lawyer-like functions, his pro se sta-
tus is not prejudicial. This is a poor proof. A thought experiment: If you were forced to 
- 8 -
land a plane in a field without ever having piloted one —resulting in a catastrophic 
crash —would you conclude that a qualified pilot is unnecessary? Of course not. 
Maese performed only those legal functions that relate to literacy. Yet reading and 
writing are poor substitutes for trial counsel; which is why Maese retained one. Despite 
this, counsel withdrew. Curtis's claim—that Maese's best efforts equate to counsel at 
trial —is made without any citation to authority and is logically deficient. 
* * * 
Maese satisfies all five prongs of the Longcrier test. Curtis claims that "no other witness 
testimony could have altered the trial court's decision/'14 Her claim is, don't bother the 
trial court with facts, it's made up its mind. 
Maese claimed —and maintains —that despite being in close proximity to Curtis on 
two occasions, he did not stalk her. His witnesses would have proved that in at least 
one instance, he was working in concert with a licensed private investigator and on the 
other occasion, Curtis felt no fear. Where Curtis alleged only two predicate incidents, 
the minimum under the statute, Maese needed to negate only one to prevail. 
A properly granted continuance would have given Maese a favorable outcome. 
POINT II. Rule 74(c) requires an appear or appoint notice regardless of a litigant's 
presence. Curtis ignores the plain language of the rule. 
Curtis fundamentally misunderstands Maese's syllogism here. It is as follows —The ma-
jor premise is: Under Utah law, where a complete breakdown in communication or an 
irreconcilable conflict exists, a trial court must permit a substitution of counsel.15 The 
14
 Brief of Appellee at 20. 
15
 State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, | 31, 984 P.2d 382. 
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minor premise is: Maese's counsel declared in open court that a breakdown in commu-
nication between him and his client occurred;16 Curtis concedes this happened.17 The 
conclusion is: Utah law required the trial court to grant Mr. Athay's withdrawal. 
Based on that conclusion, the trial court should have granted Mr. Athay's motion 
and then required Curtis to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Including Rule 
74(c)'s appear or appoint notice requirement. Instead, the trial court gave Maese a 
choice; proceed with counsel or proceed pro se, a false dichotomy. Under Utah law, the 
first choice is void. Therefore the real choice the trial court gave to Maese was, proceed 
pro se or concede the injunction. In other words, the trial court compelled Maese to 
represent himself against his will and his better judgment. 
Yet Curtis claims that this Court holds "that it is unnecessary to give an unrepre-
sented party written notice under Rule 74(c) if he already had notice/'18 She cites Els-
bury v. Elsbury for this proposition.19 Her interpretation is impermissibly liberal. 
In Elsbury v. Elsbury, Mr. Elsbury filed a substitution of counsel that read, "[Cory 
Elsbury] hereby substitutes himself as counsel replacing Marsha M. Lang, effective the 
date of her withdrawal of Counsel."20 Based on that submission, this Court held "Be-
cause Mr. Elsbury appeared on March 23, 2000, it was not necessary for Ms. Elsbury's 
16
 R. at 331A (Tr. 3:15-25, March 6, 2009.) 
17
 Brief of Appellee at 24. 
18
 Id. at 21. 
19
 Elsbury v. Elsbury, 2001 UT App 217. 
20
 Id. at | 2 . 
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counsel to give him notice or for the proceedings to be halted."21 The key ruling from 
this holding is that after voluntarily appearing, a litigant may not claim prejudice. 
In this case, the trial court gave Maese an impossible choice. After his counsel 
moved to withdraw, the Court asked Maese to choose between proceeding pro se or 
continue with counsel that had disavowed meritorious defenses. 
Instead of choosing between two bad options, Maese asked for time. He then con-
ceded Mr. Athay's motion. Maese never made a formal appearance; he never substi-
tuted himself for counsel. Elsbury is inapposite to this case. 
1. The trial court cannot give litigants impossible choices. Here, Curtis concedes 
that Maese s counsel was entitled to withdraw. Given that, the trial court gave 
Maese only one choice: proceed pro se. 
At the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court stated that: 
What the Laporto case says that's cited by Maese is that I could have required the 
hearing to go forward and required Mr. Athay to continue to represent Maese. If 
I can do that, I can certainly give Maese the option of either exercising either 
going forward with Mr. Athay or representing himself.. ,22 
Inherent in the trial court's ruling is that if it allowed Maese to represent himself, it 
could waive Rule 74(c)'s appear or appoint notice requirement. It cannot. Curtis is cor-
rect when she states that Rule 74(c) "dictates the procedure for after an attorney with-
draws."23 The procedure requires the opposing party to serve an appear or appoint 
notice on the party whose attorney has withdrawn. Here, that did not happen. 
The trial court's ruling effective compelled Maese to represent himself, pro se. 
21
 Id. at | 5 . 
22
 R. at 349 (Tr. 5:3-9, May 5, 2009). 
23
 Brief of Appellee at 23. 
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2. Counsel withdrew because he had not prepared a meritorious defense. He then de-
clared his ineffectiveness. 
Curtis continues to distort the record and states Maese7s "Counsel withdrew because he 
would not file motions Maese wanted him to file/7 As argued above, Mr. Athay relied 
solely on a mootness argument to defeat the stalking injunction, forsaking meritorious 
defenses. He then stated: 
I do not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Maese in this matter, 
and I think he would agree with that.24 
His monologue was an amalgamation of why he should withdraw from the case. 
For Curtis to state that Mr. Athay withdrew simply because Maese wanted him to file 
motion and he did not, is insincere. 
3. The trial court's ruling on the Rule 74(c) issue is clear. 
As argued above, the trial court ruled on Maese7s Rule 74(c) issue on the merits. When 
challenged by Maese, the trial court explicitly stated "My actions in this case were com-
pletely consistent with Rule 74."25 That statement shows: The trial court heard Maese7s 
argument; it evaluated it on the merits; and it concluded Maese was wrong. While the 
Court made no lengthy findings of facts or conclusions of law, it nonetheless found that 
its actions were congruent with Utah law. A meritorious ruling. 
POINT III. On Appeal, Maese has not argued a constitutional right to counsel in a 
civil stalking injunction. 
Curtis argues a point in her brief not made by Maese. Maese asks that this portion of 
her brief be stricken as moot and superfluous. 
24
 R. at 331A (Tr. 3:24-4:1, March 6, 2009). 
25
 R. at 349 (Tr. 5:2-3, May 5, 2009). 
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POINT IV. Attorneys' fees are inappropriate here. 
Curtis claims this appeal is "merely a continuation of Maese's pattern of harassment 
against Ms. Curtis."26 And that "The arguments made by Maese were simply meant to 
further harass Ms. Curtis."27 
Unlike Curtis's brief, Maese7 s briefs focus on the law and relevant facts applied to 
the law —without personal attacks. Moreover, the Court previously withdrew its sua 
sponte motion for summary disposition. It saw a claim meritorious enough to deserve 
plenary presentation. That alone demonstrates a genuine issue of law remains in ques-
tion and fees are inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial court's entry of 
judgment and permit Mr. Maese time to retain new counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 11th day of February, 2010. 
S. Steven Maese 
Appellant Pro Se 
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27
 Id. At 31. 
^ — 
~ 1 3 ~ 
